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We consider the optimal design of exible use in a digital-rights-management
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provider has to trade o¤ consumersvaluation of a licensed copy against the sales
lost to piracy.
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1 Introduction
The arrival of digital goods came with the promise of easy transferability and
portability across various media and devices. In fact, for a user of digital goods,
the corresponding exibility is often an essential aspect of their valuation. Yet, for
the provider of these goods, exibility comes with the risk that unlicensed copies
will circulate and undermine revenue-generating sales.
The objective of digital-rights-management (DRM) technologies is to enable
the providers of digital goods to control the details of how consumers can use
the goods. In many current DRM systems, the provider attempts to control the
consumersuse of the good along several dimensions. Typical parameters include
how long the consumer can use the good, how often he can use it, on how many
devices he can use it simultaneously, and whether he can copy or alter it in any
way.
In the current paper we aim to analyze the basic design of a DRM system as
an optimal trade-o¤ between the increase in the value of a licensed copy and the
increase in the number of unlicensed copies. Intuitively, an increase in the allowed
exibility of a digital product increases the value of the product for its user and
hence allows the seller to charge a higher price for a licensed copy. On the other
hand, with an increase in exibility comes the risk that a non-paying customer
obtains, legally or not, access to the digital good. Hence an increase in exibility
may undermine sales volume. In addition, we study the role of a secure platform
that is required to use the digital good. Such a platform allows the seller to extract
extra rent and can therefore allow for a higher level of exibility for the digital
good. A key question therefore is whether the platform and the digital good are
sold by separate rms or by an integrated rm.
We begin our analysis with a single content provider who o¤ers a digital good
to many consumers. The consumers have to choose between acquiring a licensed
copy of the product and hoping to receive an unlicensed copy. The likelihood that
the consumer is able to receive an unlicensed copy is increasing in the exibility
permitted by the DRM. The policy instruments of the content provider are price
and permitted exibility. An increase in the exibility increases the revenue per
item sold, but it also increases the likelihood that a given consumer obtains access
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to an unlicensed copy. The resulting equilibrium policies of the content provider
attempt to nd the optimal balance between exibility and sales. In equilibrium,
the consumers are divided into buyers of licensed products and consumers of
unlicensed copies. The equilibrium volume of sales is determined endogenously
by price and exibility. An important determinant of the equilibrium policies is
the rate at which licensed copies translate into access to unlicensed copies. In
reality, this may depend on factors such as bandwidth of internet links, social
connectedness, and other technological as well economic determinants. We show
that in the absence of piracy, the provider chooses the socially e¢ cient level of
exibility but reduces exibility in response to an increasing threat of piracy.
In the case of online music sales, the most successful example is certainly Apple.
It is currently by far the dominant provider of high quality digital-music les with
its music store and playback software iTunes. Apples success in selling music
les is closely connected to its introduction of the portable music player iPod.
In addition to having a signicantly larger storage capacity than the previously
common ash memories, the iPod also makes use of DRM technology. Only high
quality les bought from Apple and those extracted from a users own CDs using
the iTunes software can be played by an iPod.1 Conversely, the high-quality les
from Apples iTunes store can only be played on its own devices. The software
and hardware provided by Apple clearly represent complementary products to the
digital good. In the specic case of iTunes and iPods, they represent a platform
for the use of the digital good that enhances the value of that good. At the same
time, the digital goods sold by Apple can be used only on the platform provided
by Apple. The platform thus achieves two objectives for Apple. It enhances the
security of the DRM system itself, but it also restricts the use of unlicensed copies.
Even the unlicensed copies can essentially only be used on the Apple platform.
As a result, Apple as the platform provider can realize revenue from two sources:
the sales of the music les and the sale of the platform (i.e. the hardware and
associated software).
We therefore investigate the role of a platform in the context of DRM. We as-
sume that, although the digital good may be acquired in the form of an unlicensed
1The iPod also plays low quality les as MP3 which certainly are no perfect substitutes for
high quality les.
3
copy, it still has to run on the platform. This assumption completely removes con-
cern about the security of the platform, but the essential part of the argument
only requires that the platform be less susceptible to an unlicensed use than the
digital good itself.
We then compare the outcomes of two polar cases, assuming rst that separate
rms sell the digital good and the platform and then that an integrated rm sells
both. The analysis of two separate rms shows that there is a natural conict
between the owner of the rights to the digital good and the owner of the rights
to the platform. The owner of the digital good would like to increase the revenue-
generating sales of the good. For this reason, the content provider seeks to reduce
the exibility and increase the price. On the other hand, the platform provider
cares less about the revenue coming from the sales of the digital good and more
about the perceived value of the platform. He therefore wants to increase the
exibility of the DRM system, thus increasing the number of circulating copies of
the digital good, licensed or not, in order to sustain the market for the platform.
We show that the resulting equilibrium leads to a low level of exibility, a high
price of the digital good and a low price for the platform.
Next we analyze the case of a single provider that sells both a platform for
his digital content and the content itself. The products are o¤ered jointly but
priced separately. We show that the joint provider who also sells a platform nds
it optimal to provide each user with the socially e¢ cient level of exibility, in
contrast to the provider who doesnt sell a platform and constrains exibility. In
addition, the price of the digital good itself is lower than before, even considering
the higher level of exibility. However, the joint provider is less concerned about
the unlicensed segment of the market, because he can recover part of the surplus
that arises due to the availability of unlicensed access through revenue from the
sale of the platform itself. Consequently, the price of the platform serves the same
function as an entrance fee to an amusement park. Because the content provider
cannot extract all the surplus in the market for digital goods, he leaves surplus to
the consumers. Thus, he can charge a substantial price for the platform that gives
the consumers access to the market for digital goods. In fact, we show that the joint
provider charges a higher price for the platform than the platform provider in the
case of separate rms. Note that this is a novel business model that contrasts with
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the model employed in other markets of complementary goods in which customers
make a one-time purchase of a device and then make recurring purchases of items
that complement the device or subscribe to a complementary service. For example,
Gillette makes money by selling blades not razors, and integrated communications
companies make money by signing up cell-phone subscribers rather than by selling
phones.
The development of Apples use of DRM since its entry into the digital music
market strongly resembles the ndings of our model. Initially, under the iTunes
DRM rules, exibility was rather limited. Each music le could be played on only
ve devices at the same time that had to be authorized by the buyer of the le.
Playlists, i.e. specic arrangement of several les, could only be burned to CDs
seven times (see the standard restrictions in Apple (2011)). At the time Apple as
the provider of the platform was in a relatively weak position when negotiating
with the music industry who owned the rights to the digital music les. These
early negotiations were characterized by the conict between separate content
provider and platform provider predicted by our model. In fact, the Financial
Times quotes a music industry insider as saying Our music is not something to
be given away to sell iPods.(Financial Times, 2/2/2005).
By 2008 Apple had become the dominant player in the market for digital music
with a signicantly increased bargaining position with the music industry, moving
the situation closer to our assumption of a joint provider.2 In 2007 Apple started a
public push for the sale of les without DRM restrictions resulting in agreements
with some record labels to sell DRM-free les at higher prices (Apple (2007)). By
April of 2009 all music sold on iTunes was available without DRM restrictions
(Apple (2009)). In contrast, in markets for digital goods where Apple does not
have a dominant platform such as TV shows and movies, the les are still only
sold with severe DRM restrictions (Apple (2011)).
Related Literature. Several authors have put forth arguments about why
piracy of easily reproducible goods might be benecial to providers as well as
consumers, thus adding new aspects to the discussion about copyright protection.
Liebowitz (1985) was the rst to show that, when each good is shared by a dened
2In April 2008 the iTunes Store became the top music retailer in the U.S. (Apple (2008)).
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group of consumers (also called a club), the provider can indirectly appropriate
revenues from all members of the group by charging a higher price. Varian (2000)
nds that piracy in groups can be benecial to the provider if sharing is cheaper
than producing additional units, or if it enables price discrimination based on con-
sumersdi¤erent valuations. Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman (1999) emphasize
that selling to groups may reduce demand uncertainty (just as bundling reduces
it) and thus enable more protable pricing. Parker and van Alstyne (2005) con-
sider the pricing of complementary products in a model of two-sided markets. In
our model, the complementary products, content and platform, are o¤ered in a
single market.
Dropping the assumption of sharing in dened groups, Conner and Rumelt
(1991) and Takeyama (1994) show that piracy can increase prots if the good
exhibits a positive network externality. Because piracy expands the user base,
thus increasing the value of the good, the provider can charge buyers higher prices
than he could without piracy. Sundararajan (2004) considers the role of digital
management to restrict digital piracy in the context of an optimal pricing model.
In his model, the possibility of piracy acts as a constraint on the pricing policy,
but there is no interaction between the level of exibility and the implicit cost of
piracy in terms of foregone sales. Regarding illegal online sharing of music, recent
empirical studies by Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Rob and Waldfogel
(2004) show a very limited e¤ect of piracy on legal music sales.
2 Model
The digital good is demanded by a continuum of consumers on the unit interval
[0; 1]. The gross utility of consumer i from a digital good is given by
iu () :
The valuation i represents the willingness to pay for the digital good, whereas
 2 [0; 1] represents the exibility with which the digital good can be used by the
consumer. The utility for exibility u () is increasing and strictly concave with
u0 () ! 1 for  ! 0 and u0 (1) = 0. For simplicity, we shall assume that i = i
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and that the consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
The seller of the digital good determines the price p and the level of exibility
 at which the digital goods are sold to the consumers. The level of exibility  is
the key choice variable in the sellers DRM design. For simplicity, we shall assume
that the marginal cost of increasing exibility is constant and equal to zero.3 The
revenue of the seller is given by the product of the price p and the sold quantity
q 2 [0; 1]. With zero marginal cost, net prot is equal to the revenue, i.e.
(p; q) = pq.
Each consumer i can purchase the digital good at the o¤ered price p and
exibility . The net utility of a purchase for consumer i is then
iu ()  p.
We refer to the digital good that is purchased from the seller as a licensed product.
In the presence of a greynet,a potential buyer can alternatively attempt to
obtain the digital good unlicensed as a pirated copy. However, a consumer who
doesnt buy the digital good cannot be certain of receiving a pirated copy. Instead,
a pirating consumer receives a copy only with a probability  (; ) 2 [0; 1] so that
the expected utility for consumer i of pirating is
 (; ) iu () :
For simplicity we assume that  (; ) = . The key idea is that the proba-
bility of receiving an pirated copy is increasing in the exibility  with which the
licensed versions are sold. The parameter  2 [0; 1] represents an exogenous access
rate to digital goods and characterizes the permeability of the content-distribution
environment, not the good itself. We consider  to capture both technical and non-
technical factors, so increased permeability can result, e.g., from factors such as
3In the case of digital goods, the assumption of low marginal costs appears to be rather
innocuous. We should point out, however, that, in the presence of DRM technology, there is a
sense in which the cost of providing exibility may not be constant or even monotone increasing.
It might be most di¢ cult technically to support intermediate levels of exibility; very lenient or
very strict DRM rules may be easier to implement.
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higher internet bandwidth or contact frequency among consumers, or from more
lenient copyright laws or less vigilant enforcement of existing copyright laws. The
probability of obtaining a pirated copy is therefore increasing both in the exibil-
ity  of the digital good itself as well in the permeability  of the environment.




that is a higher level of permeability doesnt reduce the e¤ect of exibility and
vice versa.
In Section 4, we introduce the possibility of a platform in the form of a hard-
ware device, a secure application program, or a secure hardware-software combi-
nation that is the only environment in which the content can be consumed. In
this case, there will be an additional product that the consumers need to acquire
in order to be able to realize the utility from the digital goods. Yet, this will not
a¤ect the basic elements of demand for digital goods presented in the model.
3 The Price of Flexibility
For a given exibility  and price p set by the provider of the digital good, the
consumer i decides to purchase a licensed copy if his net utility from a purchase
is greater than his expected utility from pirating:
iu ()  p  iu () :
The marginal buyer with valuation  is exactly indi¤erent between buying and
pirating, and  is given by:
 =
p
(1  )u () :
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Since all consumers with valuation i   are buyers, the provider faces a demand
function for licensed copies of
q (p; ) = 1  p
(1  )u () : (1)
The demand for the digital good is decreasing in p as would be expected. The in-
teresting comparative static is the impact of the choice of exibility  on demand.
Proposition 1 (Flexibility and Piracy)
1. In the absence of any piracy threat,  = 0, the demand is strictly increasing
in the level of exibility .
2. With the threat of piracy,  > 0, demand is single-peaked in the level of
exibility , initially increasing but then decreasing.
The proofs of all the results are relegated to the appendix. The fact that with
the possibility of piracy the demand is single-peaked captures the key trade-o¤
facing the seller of digital goods when deciding about the level of exibility in
his DRM design. An increase in exibility leads to a higher value of the product
for the consumers which has a positive e¤ect on demand. Yet, at the same time
the increase in exibility leads to a higher likelihood of obtaining a pirated copy
which has a negative e¤ect on demand. Initially the increase in utility more than
o¤sets the piracy threat and demand increases with exibility, but since the mar-
ginal utility of any single consumer for exibility is decreasing, it is ultimately
dominated by the easy access to pirated copies and leads to lower demand.
The revenue of the provider depends on the charged price p and the allowed
exibility , with:
(p; q) = pq (p; ) : (2)
Maximizing this prot over p and  leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 2 (Optimal Choice of Flexibility)
1. For  = 0, the provider chooses the e¢ cient level of exibility 0 = 1 and




2. For  > 0, the provider sets exibility to  < 1 implicitly dened by
(1  )u0 ()  u () = 0
and sells the digital good at a price of p = 1
2
(1  )u ().
3. The optimal level of exibility , the optimal price p and the providers
prot are decreasing in the threat of piracy .
Without the threat of piracy the provider acts like a standard monopolist and
sets the exibility at the highest possible level since it comes at zero cost. Once
the threat of piracy appears and  increases from zero, exibility comes at a
cost of decreased sales. Therefore the provider cuts back exibility to reduce the
probability of consumers obtaining a pirated copy to the point where the positive
e¤ect on demand is o¤set by the negative e¤ect. Since the lower exibility also
reduces the utility buyers of licensed copies receive from the digital good, the
provider also has to reduce the price. The higher the threat of piracy , the more
the provider cuts exibility and price and the lower are his prots.
4 Platform and Flexibility
In the presence of the greynet, the provider even though a monopolist  is
constrained in capturing the utility that the consumers derive from the digital
good. Because every consumer can always try to obtain unlicensed copies instead
of buying licensed ones, the provider is forced by this outside option to leave
an extra rent to all consumers. The provider of the digital good therefore faces
the problem of recovering the residual surplus from the consumer. A feasible and
common strategy in digital-content distribution is the provision of a platform on
which to use the digital good. In the current section, we therefore introduce a
second product, a platform that is required in order to use the digital good. In
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the case of digital audio les, the immediate examples include digital music players
such as Apples iPod.
In economic terms, the platform constitutes a complimentary product to the
digital good. In the presence of a platform, even the consumers who own unlicensed
copies of the digital good have to buy the platform to consume the digital good. In
other words, the platform does not create any additional value for the buyer over
and above the consumption of the digital good. It simply represents a gatekeeper
to the digital good. The platform owner can now recover some of the rent that
the buyers obtained in the market for digital goods.
We denote by r the price of the platform. Now the utility consumer i receives
from purchasing a licensed copy is given by
iu ()  p  r
and the utility consumer i receives from pirating the digital good is given by4
iu ()  r:
Conditional on purchasing the platform, the marginal buyer of the digital good




(1  )u () :
In addition, we now have to specify the marginal buyer of the platform with
valuation . If the marginal buyer of the platform is a consumer who plans to
pirate the digital good, he is indi¤erent between purchasing the platform and not
participating in the market at all
u ()  r = 0:
4We assume that consumers who choose to pirate have to purchase the platform before they
know if they will obtain an unlicensed copy.
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All consumers with i   purchase the platform and among these, all con-
sumers with i   purchase licensed copies of the digital good so the demand
function for the platform Q (r; ) and the demand function for the digital good
are simply:
Q (r; ) = 1  r
u ()
;
q (p; ) = 1  p
(1  )u () :
The demand for the digital good is as before, decreasing in its price p and single
peaked in its level of exibility . The demand for the platform is also decreasing
in its price r. In addition, however, it is strictly increasing in the exibility  of
the digital good. We see that while a higher level of exibility has an ambiguous
e¤ect on the demand for the digital good itself, it has a strictly positive e¤ect on
the demand for the platform.
4.1 Separate Firms
We rst analyze the role of the platform in the context where the property rights
to the platform technology and to the digital good are in the hands of separate
rms. In this case, a classic conict arises between the platform provider and the
content provider. In the case of separate providers, the provider of the digital good
chooses his price p and exibility  to solve
max
p;
pq (p; ) ;
while the provider of the platform chooses only his price r to solve
max
r
rQ (r; ) :
This leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 (Separate Firms) If the digital good and the platform are sold
by separate rms, then
1. the provider of the digital good sets exibility   1 and selling the digital
good at p = 1
2
(1  )u ();
2. the provider of the platform takes sells the platform at r = 1
2
u ().
Thus, in the presence of separate rms, the digital content provider behaves as
in Proposition 2. Since the provider of the digital good doesnt take into account
the e¤ect his choice of exibility has on the demand for the platform he behaves
in the same way as if there were no platform. He chooses the level of exibility
that maximizes legal demand and then sets the monopolist price. The provider
of the platform simply reacts to the level of exibility chosen by the digital-good
provider and sets his own price in accordance. While increasing exibility has a
purely positive e¤ect on the prot of the platform provider (because it increases
the value of access to the digital good), the digital-good provider faces the trade-
o¤ between increasing the value of licensed copies and restricting the availability
of unlicensed ones.
4.2 Integrated Firm
We now analyze the role of the platform in the context of a single rm that sells
both the digital good and the platform. In other words, the seller has the property
rights and controls the prices of the digital content as well as the platform. In this
case the joint provider chooses price p and exibility  for the digital good and
price r for the platform to solve
max
p;r;
fpq (p; ) + rQ (r; )g :
This leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 4 (Integrated Firm) If the digital good and the platform are sold
by an integrated rm, then
1. the joint provider chooses the e¢ cient level of exibility  = 1, regardless
the threat of piracy ;
2. the price charged for the digital good is p = 1
2
(1  )u (1) with p < p;
3. the platform is sold at a price r = 1
2
u (1) with r > r.
The joint provider fully takes into account the e¤ect of the digital goods ex-
ibility on the demand for the good itself and on the demand for the platform.
When increasing the level of exibility beyond  the provider loses sales of li-
censed copies to easier piracy. To recoup the lost sales the provider reduces the
price below p so he ends up o¤ering a higher level of exibility at a lower price.
He can a¤ord to do so because at the same time he sells the platform at a higher
price. Since exibility is socially costless but valuable the provider maximizes to-
tal welfare by setting exibility at the e¢ cient level and extracting the additional
rent from consumers through platform sales.
4.3 Distribution Multiplier
Finally, we consider the implications of allowing the probability  of receiving a
pirated copy of the digital good to depend also on the number of legal copies in
distribution:
 (; ; q) = q:
This implies that there is a distribution multiplier: the more legal copies are in cir-
culation, the easier it is to gain access to a pirated version of the digital good. The
multiplicative structure implies that the quantity q is complementary to both the
exibility  of the digital good and the permeability  of the content-distribution
environment. In the presence of the distribution multiplier, the demand is not
linear anymore in the price as in (1). In turn, the content provider does not nec-
essarily want to sell to a constant proportion of the market anymore as it was
previously the case.
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In fact, with separate rms, the equilibrium structure will display an increase
in the segmentation across consumers. There will be low valuation consumers with
valuations such that  2 [0; ) who dont purchase the platform and a fortiori dont
purchase the licensed digital content; there will be medium valuation customers
with valuations  2 [; ) whon only buy the platform but access the digital
content in the unlicensed format and nally high valuation customer  2 [; 1]
who buy both the platform and the digital good.
Consumer is net utility from purchasing a legal copy of the digital good re-
mains unchanged,
iu ()  p;
but the expected utility of using pirates copies is now given by
qiu () :
The marginal buyer of the digital good who is exactly indi¤erent between buying
and pirating now has a valuation  which depends on the quantity q,
 =
p
(1  q)u () :
Since the quantity demanded satises q = 1    this implies that demand is the
root of a quadratic equation and is given by
q (p; ) =
(1 + )u () 
q
(1 + )2 u ()2   4u () (u ()  p)
2u ()
:
Put together, this implies that  <  and consumers are partitioned based on their
valuation such that  2 [0; ) dont buy anything,  2 [; ) only buy the platform
and  2 [; 1] buy platform and digital good.The key properties, and the associated
calculus of the previous propositions remain una¤ected by this complication but
the distribution multiplier leads to the following additional e¤ects.
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Proposition 5 (Distribution Multiplier) The digital-good provider lowers sales
to q < 1
2
. In the presence of a separate platform provider this leads to a partition
of consumers:
1. low valuation consumers dont participate in the market;
2. medium valuation consumers buy the platform but pirate the digital good;
3. high valuation consumers buy the platform and the digital good.
By contrast, we observe that in the presence of an integrated rm, the in-
tegrated rm charges a su¢ ciently high price for the platform, and the digital
content is o¤ered at a price su¢ ciently low, such that the observed additional
segmentation with separate rms will not arise. In other words, all the consumers
who have already purchased the platform at a substantial price, are now willing to
pay the incremental price to access the digital good for sure rather than accepting
the expected utility associated with a pirated copy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a simple analysis of the role exibility and platform
play in digital rights management. The basic model shows that the optimal use
of exibility displays an important trade-o¤ between providing a higher value to
paying customers and increasing the likelihood of distribution through channels
other than legitimate sales. We then show that a platform for the digital goods
may lead to a socially benecial improvement in the design of the exibility rules
if digital good and platform are owned by the same seller. However, if digital good
and platform are complementary goods, but o¤ered and priced by di¤erent sellers,
then a conict over the optimal exibility rule emerges.
Our basic model had a number of simplifying features. Clearly, the analysis
will have to be extended to better understand the emerging market structure
and security provisions for digital goods. In many instances, content is available
in many forms. Music, for example, is distributed through radio, TV, CDs, and
digital copying. Because the demand for music in each market segment interacts
with the other segments, the distribution and management policies will naturally
16
be dependent on the structure of the other market segments. We began with a
single provider and a single platform, and it is logical to ask how DRM would be
a¤ected by competing providers and platforms.
On the demand side, it seems natural to think about the intensity of demand
for digital goods and the ease with which unlicensed copies can be obtained. The
music industrys concern about le sharing by students in college dormitories
clearly arises in part from the fact that their best customers in terms of sales
volume are the ones that have the best technology for accessing unlicensed copies.
Finally, as soon as exibility becomes an issue, more sophisticated pricing
strategies seem natural. In this paper, we focused on the single-le pricing policy,
but other plans are clearly being used or conceived to nd an optimal trade-o¤.
For example, monthly fees for limited or unlimited access to databases of music
les are alternatives to single-le transactions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For  = 0 the expression for q (p; ) in (1) simplies to
q (p; ) = 1   p=u () which is decreasing in . For  > 0, di¤erentiating q (p; )




(1  )u0 ()  u ()
(1  )2 u ()2
:
Since u is increasing and concave, for small values of  the term (1  )u0 () is
big and the term u () is small so that @q (p; ) =@ > 0. As  increases the rst
term decreases and the second increases, eventually leading to @q (p; ) =@ < 0.

Proof of Proposition 2.Maximizing prot given by (2), the rst order condition
with respect to  is given by
p2
(1  )u0 ()  u ()
(1  )2 u ()2
= 0 ) (1  )u0 ()  u () = 0: (3)
The rst order condition with respect to p yields
1  2 p




(1  )u () : (4)
which results in a demand of q (p; ) = 1=2. For  = 0, equation (3) simplies





u (1) from equation (4).





u0 () + u ()
(1  )u00 ()  2u0 () < 0;






u () < 0:











Proof of Proposition 3. The provider of the digital good faces the same problem
as before, resulting in the rst order conditions (3) and (4). The provider of the










Proof of Proposition 4. Di¤erentiating the joint providers prot with respect





u () (1  ) ; r = 1
2
u () :
Di¤erentiating the joint providers prot with respect to  we get the rst order
condition
p2
(1  )u0 ()  u ()
(1  )2 u ()2
+ r2
u0 () + u ()
()2 u ()2
= 0: (6)
Substituting in the expressions for p and r the condition simplies to u0 () = 0,
which implies the e¢ cient level of exibility  = 1. The expression for p is
maximized at  given by (3) so it has to be lower for  and therefore p < p.
The expression for r is increasing in  so it has to be higher for  and therefore
r > r. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Using the inverse demand the digital-good provider
maximizes
qp (q; ) = q (1  q) (1  q)u () :
Di¤erentiating with respect to q we get
u () ((1  q) (1  q)  q (1  q)  q (1  q)) = 0
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A separate platform provider takes p, q and  as given and maximizes






which implies a price of r = 1
2
qu () and the quantity Q = 1
2
as before. Put
together, this implies that  <  and consumers are partitioned based on their
valuation such that  2 [0; ) dont buy anything,  2 [; ) only buy the platform
and  2 [; 1] buy platform and digital good. 
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